Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 180-188. Unskilled, unaware, or both? The contribution of social-perceptual skills and statistical regression to self-enhancement biases. American Journal of Psychology, 120, 593-618. Perceptions of self and other in the prisoner’s dilemma: Outcome bias and evidential reasoning. More than an artifact: Regression as a theoretical construct. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 569–579. The consistency (i.e., non-independence) of responding after the Archimedean moment amplifies and distorts individual differences in ability it does not provide a more sensitive measure.īaron, J., & Hershey, J. Unfortunately, scores in this extended range can no longer be modeled linearly. Surrendering the principle of independence widens the range of scores. If the aha! experience follows the detection of the correct rule underlying all the individual problems, consistent responding leads to a very high score if, however, the aha! experience follows the contemplation of an incorrect rule, the final score will be even lower than it would be by guessing alone. Instead, participants are allowed to have an aha! experience and to respond consistently thereafter. In the new studies, the principle of independence is defenestrated (thrown out of the window). Answering one question correctly should not be affected by success or failure on the preceding items. At the time, the test questions met the psychometric principle of independence. In the classic study, the lowest scores were obtained by those who were guessing or by those very few who by dumb luck did even worse than guessing. The difference lies-of course-in the method. Plotting estimates of own performance against measured performance, they find a U-shaped curve, which amounts to a quadratic trend in statistical analysis. Williams, Dunning, and Kruger (2013) now present data with just this sort of pattern. The idea that stupid people are also plagued by meta-stupidity could be corroborated, for example, their estimated percentiles (i.e., what percentages of others they think they outperformed) were even higher than the estimates provided by intermediate performers. Claiming 2 layers of stupidity is not parsimonious (not smart) if a single linear model can explain the data. Ross Mueller and I suggested that a hypothesis that refers to two separate phenomena (type I stupidity and type II stupidity) requires separate measures. These people are doubly stupid because they get low scores without realizing that they do. By contrast, Dunning and colleagues maintain that there is something special about stupid people. They both tend to self-enhance, and neither achieves perfect accuracy. The regression account of the pattern makes no psychological distinctions between stupid and smart people other than that the former are stupider than the latter.
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